Lawyers, language and legal professional standards: Legal Services Commissioner v Turley [2008] LPT 4 by Jones, Nicky
1 
 
LAWYERS, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS:  
LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER v TURLEY [2008] LPT 4 
 
NICKY JONES 

 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Lawyers have a duty to cooperate with other legal practitioners, with clients and with others 
they deal with in practice, and to treat them with courtesy.  The duty includes the expectation 
that a practitioner will not use irresponsible, provocative, offensive or intimidatory language 
during court proceedings or in any other public forum.  The Roman poet Horace is said to 
have noted that ‘lawyers are men who hire out their words and anger’.  The modern lawyer 
too will get angry.  Sometimes it is feigned, but genuine anger is still inevitable in a role that 
necessarily involves conflict.  But what the lawyer does with his or her anger or how the 
lawyer gives expression to it is, as it is for any person, a matter for ethical evaluation.   
 
The use of poor or aggressive language is an area where discipline applications seem to be on 
the rise.  As is evident from the analyses of courts and tribunals, this is much more than a 
simple question of decorum.  It can raise significant questions regarding the place of the 
lawyer in the administration of justice.  This became evident in the decision of the Legal 
Practice Tribunal in Legal Services Commissioner v Turley,
1
 in which a solicitor was charged 
with making ‘scandalous and offensive submissions’ during court proceedings and using an 
intimidatory approach to a judicial officer.  Drawing on the principles expressed in 
disciplinary proceedings case law in this area, the article will consider some of the issues 
arising in relation to a legal practitioner’s use of offensive language or intimidatory conduct. 
 
II LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER V TURLEY 
 
A Charges against the legal practitioner 
 
In this case, the respondent solicitor, Mr Turley, was charged with two breaches of 
professional standards. 
 
The first charge was based on comments made by Mr Turley in the course of representing a 
mother in child protection proceedings in the Magistrates Court at Gladstone.  In his first 
comment, Mr Turley described the service of an affidavit upon his client, presumably by the 
Department of Child Safety, as ‘the lowest act of any department that this office has seen.  
Certainly the lowest act I have seen in 35 years by the department.’  He further commented 
that ‘one cannot trust the department.  It is almost staffed by animals.’  Next, Mr Turley 
described an order that his client’s children undergo psychological treatment as one which 
asked ‘the client, my client, to let her children be killed or destroyed by’ the relevant doctor.  
Finally, he stated that ‘the children should be returned to my client and not put in the hands of 
these people who are almost like a (coven) of witches.’2 
 
The second charge concerned a letter written by Mr Turley and sent to the presiding 
magistrate three days after the hearing.  During the hearing, the magistrate had warned the 
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solicitor, saying ‘If you continue using language like that I will report you to the Law 
Society.’  Mr Turley claimed in his letter that he was concerned by ‘threats’ that had been 
made by the magistrate during the hearing and considered that the threats constituted ‘a threat 
with menaces not only arising in this case but in other matters into the future.’  Moreover, he 
stated in the letter, ‘such was the degree of impropriety of that threat that you should 
disqualify yourself from further conduct of this matter.’3 
 
B Tribunal reasons and orders 
 
The Legal Practice Tribunal found that ‘[t]he use of grossly offensive language in the course 
of Court proceedings and an intimidatory approach to a judicial officer based on an untenable 
interpretation of what had occurred in the Court proceedings [were] matters of some 
gravity.’4 
 
In relation to the second charge, the Tribunal confirmed that Mr Turley’s letter was ‘an 
improper ex parte communication with the Bench’ and that his contention was untenable: the 
magistrate had made a ‘reasonable attempt to pull [Mr Turley] into line’ and should not have 
been subjected to the implied intimidation in the letter nor to pressure to disqualify himself 
when there was simply no justification for him to do so.
5
   
 
The Tribunal ruled that each of the breaches surpassed unsatisfactory professional conduct 
and amounted to professional misconduct. 
 
III ISSUES FOR THE COURT TO CONSIDER 
 
A Professional privilege and responsibility 
 
An important issue arising in this case concerns the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court.  
Although a legal practitioner has a clear duty to represent and advance a client’s interests,6 
the courts have cautioned that that this duty is subject to the practitioner’s duty to the court to 
act with fairness, honesty and candour.
7
  As an officer of the court, a legal practitioner must 
not cast baseless aspersions on other parties, witnesses or third parties.  The professional 
privilege and immunity from prosecution which advocates enjoy in relation to their court 
work impose on them a commensurate professional responsibility not to make allegations 
without a sufficient basis or reasonable grounds. 
 
The issues of professional privilege and responsibility were discussed in Clyne v NSW Bar 
Association,
8
 in which the High Court considered the conduct of a barrister who deliberately 
used court proceedings ‘to make a savage public attack on the professional character’ of a 
solicitor who was the subject of the proceedings.
9
  The court affirmed the earlier decision to 
disbar the barrister and noted that ‘from the point of view of a profession which seeks to 
maintain standards of decency and fairness, it is essential that the privilege, and the power of 
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doing harm which it confers, should not be abused.  Otherwise grave and irreparable damage 
might be unjustly occasioned.’10  The court observed that the disbarring order was made 
‘from the public point of view, for the protection of those who require protection, and from 
the professional point of view, in order that abuse of privilege may not lead to loss of 
privilege.’11  This principle was cast as rule 37 of the Legal Profession (Barristers) Rule 2007 
(Qld), which states that a barrister must take care to ensure that any decisions to make 
allegations or suggestions under privilege against any person are reasonably justified or 
appropriate and are not made principally in order to harass or embarrass the person or to gain 
some collateral advantage.
12
 
 
In line with the Law Council of Australia’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct and 
Practice, legal practitioners ‘in all their dealings with the courts [...] should act with 
competence, honesty and candour.’13  Rule 13.3 further provides that a practitioner must not 
‘express views to a court on any material evidence or material issue in the case in terms 
which convey or appear to convey the practitioner’s personal opinion on the merits of that 
evidence or issue.’  This prohibition has been incorporated into rule 13.3 of the Legal 
Profession (Solicitors) Rule 2007 (Qld) and rule 22 of the Barristers Rule.   
 
In view of these principles, Mr Turley’s comments on which the first charge was based 
clearly constituted an unbalanced and emotive attack on the Department of Child Safety.  In 
terms which were neither measured nor moderate, he conveyed to the court his apparent 
personal opinion of the actions, staff and professionalism of the department.  The suggestion 
that either the opposing side or the court were asking his client ‘to let her children be killed or 
destroyed’ by allowing them to undergo psychological treatment was plainly ridiculous and 
indeed insulting. 
 
B Offensive language 
 
Further reinforcing the requirement to act with ‘honesty, fairness and courtesy’, rule 21 of the 
Solicitors Rule (based on rule 21 of the Model Rules) also stipulates as follows: 
 
A solicitor, in all of the solicitor’s dealings with other legal practitioners, must take all 
reasonable care to maintain the integrity and reputation of the legal profession by 
ensuring that the solicitor’s communications are courteous and that the solicitor 
avoids offensive or provocative language or conduct. 
 
Mr Turley’s comments in his letter sent to the presiding magistrate after the proceedings, in 
which he stated that he regarded the magistrate’s mild admonition as ‘a threat with menaces 
not only arising in this case but in other matters into the future’ and that the threat constituted 
a strong degree of impropriety, were unnecessarily belligerent.  They were also arguably 
imprudent.  Although no legal professional rules specifically address the issue of a 
practitioner’s relationship with the bench and there is no rule expressly prohibiting 
practitioners from advising the bench of their concerns regarding any disadvantage that they 
believe might flow from judicial conduct, ordinary professional prudence would suggest that 
the latter course be undertaken only where strictly necessary: where great disadvantage to 
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their client might result or where clear judicial bias had been demonstrated.  In the present 
case, the magistrate’s mild warning to Mr Turley that his continued use of unsatisfactory 
language might result in a possible report to his professional association does not appear to 
fall into either of those categories. 
 
Six months after Turley, the Legal Practice Tribunal again considered the question of 
improper language used by a solicitor in court in Legal Services Commissioner v Winning.
14
  
In this matter, Mr Winning had referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’) as 
‘this stupid woman’ and ‘this silly woman’ during his submissions to the magistrate.  
Although Mr Winning apologised to the DPP nearly two years after making the comments, 
the tribunal found that his language was ‘grossly offensive and insulting’, was highly 
discourteous to both the DPP and the court and ‘had the potential or tendency to bring the 
legal profession and criminal justice system into disrepute’.  Accordingly, the tribunal held 
that Mr Winning’s comments constituted professional misconduct.15 
 
In a comparable Western Australian case – Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v 
Quigley
16
 – the State Administrative Tribunal considered complaints that a legal practitioner 
had engaged in ‘intimidatory and threatening behaviour’ by making numerous claims in 
letters sent to the Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee and its Law Complaints Officer 
in relation to disciplinary proceedings initiated against him, including that the Committee and 
Complaints Officer were guilty of ‘serious impropriety’, ‘arrogance and foolishness’, 
‘invention and misrepresentation’, ‘unprofessional conduct’, ‘deceit and malice’ and 
‘perjury’.  The tribunal noted that these were ‘allegations of the most serious nature’ which 
had not been supported by any evidence.  Accordingly, the tribunal found Mr Quigley guilty 
of unprofessional conduct consisting of ‘conduct that would be reasonably regarded as 
disgraceful or dishonourable by practitioners of good repute and competence’.17 
 
Another recent case on point was Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v 
Slowgrove.
18
  In this matter, Mr Slowgrove had sent several letters to the magistrate presiding 
over proceedings in which he was appearing, including one in which he stated that he 
expected the magistrate to recuse himself immediately from the proceedings, indicated that 
he regarded the magistrate as personally liable to his client for exemplary damages and 
suggested that the magistrate could be liable for breaches of international law.  The 
Administrative Decisions Tribunal considered that the letter contained inflammatory and 
‘inappropriate language’ and a ‘threatening tone’ which was clearly intended to intimidate.  
Accordingly, Mr Slowgrove’s conduct was found to constitute professional misconduct, 
‘namely, conduct occurring in connection with the practice of law that would justify a finding 
that he is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.’19 
 
C Mitigating factors 
 
1 Medical conditions 
 
Although a solicitor may plead medical illness or substance addictions in an attempt to justify 
or mitigate the seriousness of his or her misconduct, evidence of such conditions will not 
                                                 
14
 [2008] LPT 13 
15
 Ibid [62]-[64]. 
16
 [2005] WASAT 215. 
17
 Ibid [148]-[149]. 
18
 [2009] NSWADT 150. 
19
 Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Slowgrove [2009] NSWADT 150, [18]-[19]. 
5 
 
necessarily carry any weight since it does not address the protective function of disciplinary 
proceedings.  This is all the more so where the solicitor’s misconduct has involved dishonest 
behaviour.
20
  A review of Australian case law confirms that courts will be reluctant to accept 
mental illness or addictions as factors mitigating a lawyer’s liability for breach of 
professional standards.
21
  However, if a court is convinced that a solicitor’s misconduct is 
indeed attributable to a mental illness or other condition, it may order that the solicitor be 
suspended from practice for a period of time in order to address and recover from or control 
the condition.  If the court allows the solicitor to remain in practice, such practice may be 
subject to certain conditions.
22
 
 
In Turley, the Legal Practice Tribunal noted that Mr Turley had been suffering from 
depression and other medical problems at the time the events took place but was now 
receiving ‘proper treatment’ for these conditions.  The tribunal took into account these 
‘personal circumstances’, as well as his previously unblemished record, and ordered that he 
receive a public reprimand.   
 
However, the tribunal also noted that it had the opportunity to ‘mould an order which will 
assist the [solicitor] to avoid the recurrence of these sorts of problems.’  Accordingly, it made 
its orders conditional upon Mr Turley’s undertakings to the tribunal that he would seek 
further psychological counselling and treatment, and further ordered that he provide a 
psychologist’s report in respect of his mental state to the Legal Services Commissioner 
within 12 months. 
 
2 Attitude 
 
The lawyer’s attitude to a tribunal’s concerns about the use of poor or intimidating language 
may also influence the court.  So, for example, any attempts to conceal or make light of 
professional misconduct, to explain, justify or deny it or to shift blame or diminish culpability 
for it will not be well regarded by the court.  In Legal Services Commissioner v Baker,
23
 the 
Legal Practice Tribunal found that Mr Baker’s use of insulting and offensive language to or 
in the presence of clients and members of his staff, together with his attempts at self-
justification and his ‘persistence and reluctance to accept the implications of his behaviour’, 
constituted a high degree of unprofessional conduct.
24
 
 
Similarly, in Slowgrove, the Administrative Decisions Tribunal expressed its concern over 
Mr Slowgrove’s varying approach to his conduct and the proceedings, ranging from his 
‘carefully couched denial’ that he had written the letter and failure to apologise for it to his 
final concession at the hearing that he had indeed drafted the document.  Indeed, the tribunal 
noted that the ‘single most troubling consideration’ was the barrister’s absence of contrition, 
or even a sense of any need for contrition, and his ‘evident lack of insight into his 
behaviour’.25 
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Conversely, if a lawyer responds honestly and frankly to the court’s enquiries, pleads guilty, 
acknowledges genuine remorse and provides evidence of rehabilitation or restoration to those 
who have suffered as a result of the breach, the court may reduce the severity of the 
disciplinary sanction imposed.
26
  An apology tendered at the time of making improper 
comments may therefore also serve to mitigate their effects and, accordingly, any resulting 
penalty orders made against a practitioner.  In Winning, the tribunal concluded that some of 
Mr Winning’s comments, although ‘offensive, insulting and discourteous not just to the 
opponent but also troubling to the Bench’, did not tend or have the potential to bring the legal 
profession or the criminal justice system into disrepute because he had offered an immediate 
apology in court, which meant that any person who heard the disparaging words would also 
have heard the apology.
27
 
 
In the present case, although Mr Turley did not tender an apology either to the court or the 
magistrate, there was no evidence that he did not accept the allegations made against him.  He 
had sought medical treatment for his depression and other problems, as was clear from a 
psychologist’s report considered in the proceeding, and he offered undertakings to the 
tribunal that he would undergo further psychological counselling and treatment.
28
  Moreover, 
the tribunal took into consideration his ‘personal circumstances’ (such as, presumably, his 
age and perhaps also his medical conditions), the many years he had practised, the fact that he 
had not previously been found guilty of any professional breach and that he had admitted the 
two charges brought against him by the Legal Services Commissioner.
29
 
 
D Sanctions 
 
In cases where lawyers have on single occasions used insulting or offensive language to an 
opponent, the lawyers involved have been reprimanded or severely censured.
30
  In contrast, a 
court will be critical of any evidence of persistent reoffending, as was clear in Baker.
31
  It will 
also consider whether there is any element of dishonesty or other impugning of the solicitor’s 
integrity inherent in his or her conduct, absence of which will count in the solicitor’s 
favour.
32
  In Turley, Mr Turley’s conduct did not reflect adversely on his honesty or integrity.  
Although his ‘use of grossly offensive language in the course of Court proceedings and an 
intimidatory approach to a judicial officer based on an untenable interpretation of what had 
occurred in the Court’ were clearly in breach of legal professional standards and indeed were 
‘matters of some gravity’,33 they did not attract a severe sanction. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 
As the case law indicates, high standards of professionalism and courtesy are imposed on a 
legal practitioner’s conduct and language in relation to other practitioners and these standards 
are reflected in the penalties which a court will impose on a practitioner whose conduct and 
language fall short.  The message that courts send to practitioners is clear: lawyers should 
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avoid any attempt to mislead, threaten or intimidate other practitioners, including judicial 
officers, or the use of any offensive, derogatory or improper language when communicating 
with clients, staff or other members of the profession.   
 
A lawyer’s breach of the high standards of legal professional conduct and courteous language 
may have significant consequences for the lawyer, giving rise to professional disciplinary 
proceedings and the possible award of penalties against him or her.  However, its 
consequences for the profession may be even more significant: it may diminish public 
confidence in the legal profession, judicial system and administration of justice as a whole.  
The rise – across Australia – in the number of disciplinary proceedings for this behaviour is, 
for a profession whose public image is already in decline,
34
 cause for serious concern. 
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